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Abstract. This article is an experiment. Consider a minimalist  model of  cognition (models,
means of model-building and history of their evolution). In this model, explanation could be
defined as a means allowing to advance: production of models and means of model-building
(thus, yielding 1st class understanding), exploration and use of them (2nd class), and/or teaching
(3rd class). At minimum, 3rd class understanding is necessary for an explanation to be respected.
This article is an experiment. Imagine a minimalist picture of cognition (model-based
model of cognition,  MBMC) where we and our robots have  only models, means of
model-building  and  history  of  their  evolution.  In  this  picture,  the  most  significant
distinction  exists  between  particular  models (mainly,  serving  as  replacements of
concrete  target  systems)  and  means  of  model-building (model  templates,  theories,
methods, hypotheses, heuristics, research programs, doctrines, paradigms, frameworks,
ontologies,  metamodels,  metametamodels,  mathematical  structures,  logic  systems,
languages, etc.).
I have been trying to promote MBMC since publishing Podnieks (2009). The ideas on
which MBMC is based were proposed separately by several authors. For an account of
the corresponding history, see Podnieks (2017).
How to recognize the phenomenon of explanation and understanding (subtleties aside)
in the picture of “only models, means of model-building and history of their evolution”?
First, let us look for further significant distinctions in this picture.
There are means of model-building (for instance, the causal paradigm) that are used as a
guide for building of theories, so, they serve as  meta-means of model-building. The
meta-level aspect represents a significant distinction in the picture proposed by MBMC. 
The evolution aspect  is significant as well: more or less long periods of stability, more
or less radical changes. Some of the models and means of model-building are used for
limited time periods only (such as phlogiston theory of combustion, or plum pudding
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Two other significant aspects: the  user community aspect and the  application domain
aspect. Models and means of model-building are accepted and used by more or less
wide  communities.  And,  they  are  applied  across  more  or  less  wide  domains  of
knowledge. For instance, the traditional realist idea (in the narrow sense – the idea that
my sensations are caused by an independent “reality” populated by creatures similar to
me) is extremely widely accepted and applied. The causal paradigm is widely accepted
and applied as a guide as well, but it has some limitations.
What should be counted as more important: observable significant distinctions (like as
the  above  ones),  or  their  correspondence  to  intuitive  notions  such  as  truth  and
explanation? If we wish, we can try establishing of such correspondences.
For example, we can try to introduce a concept of  truth.  MBMC inspires a kind of
pragmatic-operational definition of truth: truths are more or less persistent invariants of
successful evolution of models and means of model-building (evolution aspect). What is
true will not change in the future (for some time, and for some of us, at least – user
community  aspect).  The  traditional  realist  idea  represents  the  most  fundamental
invariant of model-building, hence, the first truth to believe in.
How about explanation and understanding? For inspiration, let us start with the problem
of understanding in mathematics. As William Thurston (1994) put it:
“... when Appel and Haken completed  a proof of the 4-color map theorem using a massive automatic
computation, it evoked much controversy. I interpret the controversy as having little to do with doubt
people  had  as  to  the  veracity  of  the  theorem or  the  correctness  of  the  proof.  Rather,  it  reflected  a
continuing desire for human understanding of a proof, in addition to knowledge that the theorem is true.”
(p. 162).
“Finally and perhaps most importantly, a mathematical breakthrough usually represents a new way of
thinking, and effective ways of thinking can usually be applied in more than one situation.” (p. 172)
“More than the knowledge, people want personal understanding.” (p. 173)
“... what was dramatically lacking in the beginning: a working understanding of the concepts and the
infrastructure that are natural for this subject [geometrization conjecture].” (p. 175)
Thus, according to Thurston, a mathematical idea leads to understanding, if it proposes
a “breakthrough,” “new way of thinking,” an “infrastructure” allowing for “more than
one”  problem  of  the  field  to  be  solved.  Notably,  computer-generated  parts  of
mathematical  proofs,  as  a  rule,  do not  yield  far-reaching infrastructures.  Hence,  the
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Note. As the next step, one could try connecting Thurston's argument to the famous
Rising Sea strategy promoted by Alexander Grothendieck, see McLarty (2007).
Let us apply Thurston's argument to the whole of cognition. Then, in terms of MBMC,
we  obtain  the  following  thesis:  more  than  particular  good  predictive  and  action-
recommending  models,  and  specific  means  of  model-building  people  want  stable
(evolution aspect) and widely applicable (application domain aspect) means allowing to
produce, explore, use and/or teach models and means of model-building.
What is added to our knowledge by an act of explanation? It seems, in MBMC, we
could define explanation as a means allowing to advance: production of models and
means of model-building (thus, yielding 1st class understanding), exploration and use of
them (2nd class), and/or teaching of them (3rd class). Having understood X, I can build
better models for the world around X. Or, at least, I can teach them better: at minimum,
3rd class understanding is necessary for an explanation to be respected.
For  example,  Kepler's  introduction  of  elliptic  orbits  (instead  of  epicycles  used  by
Ptolemy and Copernicus) was a great act of 1st class understanding that allowed not only
for building of radically simpler models of the Solar system, but also contributed to the
1st class idea of gravitation and all the great development that followed it.
From this perspective, special relativity and quantum mechanics represent, despite their
counter-intuitiveness, the greatest acts of 1st class understanding achieved in the 20th
century. But what about interpretations of quantum mechanics – should we qualify them
as merely 3rd class?
Many people writing about explanation pursue the following strategy A: try to identify
some significant distinction in the human cognition which could be verified as being
close  enough  to  the  “well  known”  intuitive  notion  of  explanation.  As  a  rule,  they
succeed in  the identification of  the distinction,  but  (as noted later  by the numerous
opponents)  do  not  succeed  in  approaching  closely  enough  the  intuitive  notion.  My
above proposal could be rejected on similar grounds. Therefore,  I would propose to
revert strategy A, and replace it by strategy B: identify a significant distinction in the
human cognition, name it as XYZ, and prove that XYZ is more significant than the
possibly  corresponding  intuition.  Which  of  the  two  strategies  will  appear  more
productive?
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